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URING the Survey period, Texas appellate courts were active
not only in interpreting the statutory provisions governing the
parent-child relationship but also in applying contract and com-
mon law principles to issues not directly addressed by the Texas Family
Code. The courts also struggled with arguably inequitable outcomes,
most notably in the procedure applicable to the appeal of a termination
order. Although only a few of the opinions issued during the Survey pe-
riod are discussed below, the selected opinions are intended to provide
insight into the various approaches the trial and appellate courts are tak-
ing in this area of law. Whether based on statute, contract law, or equita-
ble principles, much of the reasoning can be applied outside the specific
fact pattern in any case.
II. CHILD SUPPORT
A. INTEREST ON CHILD SUPPORT
During the 2001 session, the Texas Legislature amended section
157.265 of the Family Code, lowering the interest accrued on delinquent
child support payments from twelve percent to six percent effective Janu-
ary 1, 2002.1 In In re. M.C.C.,2 the Texas Supreme Court considered
whether the trial court erred in retroactively applying section 157.265 to
delinquent child support due before January 1, 2002, and, consequen-
tially, reducing the interest owed by the father.
The divorce decree in M. C. C. required the father to make child support
payments beginning in July 1993. 3 The father did not make all required
payments, and, in November 2001, the Attorney General filed a motion
to enforce. The trial court entered an order on May 16, 2002, reducing
the unpaid child support to a formal judgment using the six percent inter-
est rate in section 157.265. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed
the judgment, holding that the plain language of the statute required that
it be applied retroactively.4 This decision conflicted with the prospective
application of the statute by the Dallas, Amarillo, and Waco Courts of
Appeals.5
The Texas Supreme Court concluded the 2001 amendment "does not
indicate an intention by the Legislature to make the statute retroactive."'6
1. Act of May 18, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1491, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 5294, 5294,
amended by Act of May 12, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 185, § 1, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 339,
339.
2. 187 S.W.3d 383 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam).
3. Id. at 384.
4. In re M.C.C., 142 S.W.3d 504 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004), rev'd, 187 S.W.3d 383
(Tex. 2006) (per curiam).
5. In re A.R.J., 97 S.W.3d 833, 834-35 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.); In re Hurd,
No. 07-02-00334-CV, 2003 WL 1961142, at *2-3 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Apr. 28, 2003, no
pet.); In re A.B.L., No. 10-02-00267-CV, 2003 WL 21470071, at *1 (Tex. App.-Waco June
25, 2003, no pet.) (mer. op.).
6. In re M.C.C., 187 S.W.3d at 385.
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Therefore, (1) "any unpaid child support payments that have not been
judicially confirmed ... include twelve percent interest accrued through
December 31, 2001": (2) "beginning January 1, 2002, the unpaid child
support that is not judicially confirmed, including the twelve percent in-
terest" that has already accrued, starts "accruing any new interest at the
rate of six percent"; and (3) "any unpaid child support that was judicially
confirmed before January 1, 2002," accrues interest at the rate set in the
trial court's order, not at the statutory six percent rate.7
B. OFFSETS AND REIMBURSEMENTS
The Texas Supreme Court also considered the application of section
157.008 of the Family Code, which allows an offset or reimbursement of
ordered child support payments during periods when the obligor has, by
agreement, possessed a child for periods exceeding court-ordered posses-
sion.8 In In re A.M., 9 a 1982 Texas Supreme Court case, the court or-
dered the father to make monthly child support payments for his two
children. However, from December 15, 1985, through June 18, 1988, the
mother relinquished possession of both children to the father. On May
20, 1994, the mother again relinquished possession of the older child to
the father, and the child reached emancipation while living with the fa-
ther. The younger child turned eighteen on October 25, 1997, ending the
father's support obligation.' 0
The father failed to make all ordered child support payments, and, on
November 17, 1998, the Attorney General sued the father to reduce the
unpaid child support to judgment.1 "In defense, [the father] asserted
that [the mother] had voluntarily relinquished control of the children for
periods exceeding of court-ordered visitation and that he was therefore
entitled to an offset" under section 157.008.12 The father also filed a mo-
tion seeking reimbursement from the mother for support he provided to
the children during the excess periods of possession. Although the
mother appeared at trial, the trial court deemed the mother's failure to
file a written answer as an admission of the father's allegations in the
motion for reimbursement. 13
7. Id. In 2005, the Texas Legislature added subsections (d) through (f) to section
157.265, statutorily applying the six percent interest rate to child support payments that
became due on or after January 1, 2002. However, for unconfirmed arrearages in existence
on January 1, 2002, the higher interest rate applies to payments due before January 1, 2002,
and the lower rate applies to the cumulative total of arrearages and interest after that date.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 157.265 (d)-( e) (Vernon Supp. 2006). Further, a judgment for
child support rendered prior to January 1, 2002, is governed by the law in effect on the date
the judgment was entered. Id. § 157.265(f).
8. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 157.008 (Vernon 2002).
9. 192 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. 2006).
10. Id. at 579.
11. Id.




The trial court found the father owed $35,450 in unpaid child support
but was also entitled to an offset of $26,100 and reimbursement of
$15,196.86 because of his excess possession of the children. The trial
court affirmed the judgment of the child support master against the father
in the amount of $2,331, finding the master had discretion not to allow all
offsets and credits and to assess no interest. 14
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals reversed, concluding the
mother's failure to file a written answer required the trial court to give
credit for the full amount of offsets and credits to the father. 15 The At-
torney General and the mother appealed, contending section 157.008 did
not allow the father to receive both an offset and a reimbursement for
each month of extra possession. 16
The father argued section 157.008(a) provided an affirmative defense
while section 157.008(d) gave him a claim for affirmative relief, and, ac-
cordingly, he was entitled to both an offset and reimbursement.' 7 Under
this construction, section 157.008 "actually operates to shift the court-or-
dered support obligation from the obligor to the obligee during voluntary
periods of excess possession. '18
To be entitled to either an offset or to reimbursement, section 157.008
requires (1) the obligee to voluntarily relinquish actual possession and
control of the child to the obligor (2) for a period exceeding court-or-
dered periods of possession and access to the child (3) during which the
obligor supplied actual support. 19 The supreme court determined the
remedies are alternative, not cumulative. 20 Whether the obligor is enti-
tled to offset or reimbursement depends on whether the parent continued
to pay child support during the period of excess possession.21 If the obli-
gor paid child support during the period of excess possession, he is enti-
tled to reimbursement. 22 If the obligor did not pay child support, he is
limited to an offset. 23 Additionally, the supreme court concluded the
right to seek reimbursement is purely defensive; it does not give the obli-
gor an independent right to seek reimbursement for support provided by
the obligor during the period of excess possession.24 In other words, it




17. Section 157.008(a) of the Family Code gives an obligor an affirmative defense "in
whole or in part to a motion for enforcement of child support that the obligee voluntarily
relinquished to the obligor actual possession and control of a child." TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 157.008(a). Section 157.008(d) allows "an obligor who has provided actual support
to the child during a time subject to an affirmative defense under this section" to request
reimbursement for that support from the obligee. Id. § 157.008(d).
18. Id.; see § 157.008(a)-( b).








The supreme court then turned to the proof necessary to establish the
amount of support provided during the period of excess possession. The
courts of appeals had taken a number of approaches including: (1) al-
lowing the obligor to use the court-ordered support amount to measure
the offset without providing an exact accounting of actual expenditures;
(2) requiring the obligor to provide a more precise accounting of the sup-
port provided; and (3) varying the level of proof based on the circum-
stances of the case. 25 In A.M., it was undisputed the father had solely
supported the children during the periods of excess possession. It was,
therefore, a reasonable presumption that the father "was entitled to
equate his monthly child support obligation to the actual support he pro-
vided each child." 26
C. DISABILITY OF OBLIGOR
In In re G.L.S.,27 the San Antonio Court of Appeals considered the
equities involved in failing to apply to delinquent child support a lump
sum payment made to a child due to the father's disability. Although the
court ultimately followed the reasoning of the Houston First Court of
Appeals in Attorney General of Texas v. Stevens,28 and concluded that the
Family Code prohibited the trial court from granting an equitable offset
as to the father's past due child support, it invited the Texas Legislature
to address the issue.29
In G.L.S., the father was ordered to pay child support for two children
beginning in January 1990.30 On June 13, 2003, the Social Security Ad-
ministration notified the father that he was entitled to monthly disability
benefits beginning in May 2001. As a result, the oldest child, who had
turned eighteen in October 2001, received a lump sum payment of
$1,878.00. In July 2003, the youngest child received a lump sum payment
of $14,804.00 for the monthly benefit from May 2001 through July 2003.
The child would continue to receive $653.00 per month until she turned
eighteen. 31
The father failed to make all ordered payments, and, in April 2004, the
Attorney General sought to confirm the child support arrearage. In Au-
gust 2004, the trial court confirmed an arrearage for unpaid child support
of $14,982.47 and a medical support arrearage of $6,184.81. The trial
court also ordered the father to pay current child support of $250.00 per
25. Id. at 575; see Gonzalez v. Tippit, 167 S.W.3d 536, 543 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, no
pet.); Beck v. Walker, 154 S.W.3d 895, 905 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.); Curtis v.
Curtis, 11 S.W.3d 466, 472-74 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2000, no pet.).
26. In re A.M., 192 S.W.3d at 576. Justice Johnson dissented as to this portion of the
court's opinion and would have held the father to a more precise accounting as to the
amount of support provided during the periods of excess possession. Id. at 576-77 (John-
son, J. dissenting).
27. 185 S.W.3d 56 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2005, no pet.).
28. 84 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
29. In re G.L.S., 185 S.W.3d at 61.
30. Id. at 57.




The father appealed, contending he was entitled to a credit or offset
against the support payments for social security disability benefits paid to
the children as a result of his disability.33 The court of appeals first noted
that section 154.132 of the Family Code governs the effect of disability
payments on future child support payments.34 Because the record did not
reflect that the trial court calculated the amount of child support the fa-
ther would be required to pay in the future in accordance with section
154.132, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the issue of future
support to the trial court.35
The court then turned to the issue of the unconfirmed arrearages. Sec-
tion 157.262(a) of the Family Code prohibits a trial court from reducing
or modifying the amount of child support arrearages. 36 However, the
money judgment for a child support arrearage may be subject to a coun-
terclaim or offset as provided by subchapter F of chapter 157 of the Fam-
ily Code.37 Because subchapter F does not provide for an offset or
counterclaim for payments made to the child due to the parent's disabil-
ity, the trial court's determination of the amount of arrearage was a
"mechanical tally" that could not include the offset. 38 Although the legis-
lature "recognized the equity in granting a credit for social security disa-
bility benefits when establishing or modifying child support," it did not do
so for arrearages, and "may have decided to only grant the credit pro-
spectively because of the delays in the Administration's processing of dis-
ability claims."'39 The court of appeals then agreed with Stevens that
"whether an obligor is entitled to an offset against past unconfirmed child
support arrearages is an issue for the Legislature to decide. '40 Until the
legislature takes action, sections 157.262(a) and (f) of the Family Code
preclude a finding that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing a
credit for the disability payment to the child against the unconfirmed
child support arrearages. 41
D. IMPLIED CONTRACT TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT
In In re Marriage of Eilers,42 the Waco Court of Appeals considered
whether the husband could be required to pay child support for a child
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 58-59; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.132 (Vernon 2002) (requiring a court to
apply child support guidelines by determining the amount of child support that would be
ordered under guidelines and subtracting the amount of benefits or the value of the bene-
fits paid to or for the child as a result of obligor's disability).
35. In re G.L.S., 185 S.W.3d at 59.
36. Id.; see § 157.262(a).
37. In re G.L.S., 185 S.W.3d at 59; see § 157.262(f).
38. In re G.L.S., 185 S.W.3d at 59-60.
39. Id. at 61.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 205 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. App.-Waco 2006, pet. denied).
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who was neither the biological nor the adopted child of either party to the
marriage. During the marriage, the parties had two biological children
and assumed custody of another child pursuant to a notarized "Power of
Attorney Delegating Parental Authority" that was executed by the child's
biological mother.4 3 When the wife filed for divorce, she sought child
support for all three children. After the husband filed an amended
counter-petition specifically denying paternity of the non-biological child,
the wife alleged the husband equitably adopted the child or, alternatively,
contractually agreed to pay child support for the child. The trial court
ordered the husband to pay child support for all three children. 4 4
The court of appeals made short work of the wife's equitable adoption
argument, noting Texas courts have "consistently rejected the application
of equitable adoption in cases involving child custody or child support. '45
However, the court of appeals agreed with the wife that the husband
could enter into an implied contract to pay child support. 46 As with any
implied contract, an implied contract to pay child support can arise from
the acts and conduct of the parties and can be inferred from the
circumstances. 47
The husband argued the power of attorney was void as against public
policy and did not evidence that he accepted financial responsibility for
the child. The court of appeals rejected the first argument, noting that
statutes in effect for the past century have permitted parents to execute
documents transferring custody of their children to other adults or insti-
tutions, and the Family Code expressly allows for such relinquishment. 48
The court of appeals next considered whether the surrounding facts
and circumstances demonstrated the husband had agreed to financially
support the child. 49 The husband signed the power of attorney as a custo-
dian, took possession of the child, and treated the child as his son from
that point forward. Further, by signing the power of attorney, the hus-
band agreed he would be financially responsible for the child. This was
sufficient to establish an implied contract to pay child support. 50
However, an implied contract to pay child support is a contractual
debt, not a statutory obligation. 51 Accordingly, the wife had to establish
the existence of the debt, the husband's agreement to be liable for the
debt, that the wife was authorized to collect the debt, and the balance due
and owing on the debt.52 The wife failed to establish the last element
because the implied contract was vague regarding the amount of support
43. Id. at 639.
44. Id. at 639-40.
45. Id. at 641.
46. Id. at 642.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 643-44 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.103 (Vernon Supp. 2006)).







The court of appeals again turned to contract law and concluded that
when a contract is silent or ambiguous about a particular term, a trial
court may supply a reasonable term to effectuate the parties' intentions. 54
The trial court used the statutory child support guidelines to establish the
amount of child support to be paid under the implied contract.55 The
child support guidelines are "presumed to be reasonable" and the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the guidelines to supply the
missing contractual term. 56 However, the court of appeals modified the
trial court's judgment to reflect that the obligation was a contractual obli-




Although the vast majority of paternity cases during the Survey period
involved an individual contesting a designation as the biological father of
a child, in Hausman v. Hausman,58 the San Antonio Court of Appeals
addressed a situation in which the presumed father knew he was not the
biological father of the child but wanted to be named the child's parent.
The child was conceived and born during the parties' marriage. During
the divorce proceedings, the husband obtained a paternity test because he
heard another man was claiming to be the child's biological father. Al-
though the test revealed the husband was not the biological father of the
child, the husband sought to be named a joint managing conservator. The
trial court found that although the husband was not the child's biological
father, the wife was equitably estopped from denying the husband's pa-
ternity.59 The trial court then established the parent-child relationship
between the husband and the child. 60 After a jury trial on the custody
issues, the trial court named the husband and the wife joint managing
conservators of the child with the husband having the exclusive right to
determine the child's primary residence. 61
On appeal, the mother argued that section 160.608 of the Family Code
prohibited the trial court from taking any action based on a finding of
equitable estoppel other than to deny an order for genetic testing.62 The
53. Id. at 645.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.122(a) (Vernon 2002).
57. In re Marriage of Eilers, 205 S.W.3d at 645.
58. 199 S.W.3d 38 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.).
59. Id. at 40-41.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 41; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.608(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006) (providing
that in a proceeding to adjudicate parentage, the trial court may deny a motion for genetic
testing if it determines the conduct of the mother or putative father estops that party from
denying parentage and it would be inequitable to disprove father-child relationship).
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court of appeals disagreed, concluding section 160.608 addresses only
whether the trial court can deny a motion requesting genetic testing and
does not address the trial court's authority regarding orders determining
parentage. 63 Equitable estoppel is applied in paternity actions in order to
achieve fairness between the parties by holding them to their prior con-
duct regarding the paternity of the child.64 Although this theory also un-
derlies section 160.608, "nothing in section 160.608 or any other provision
of the [Family Code] appears to broadly divest a trial court of its author-
ity to apply the principles of equitable estoppel in paternity cases."'65 Ac-
cordingly, section 160.608 did not preclude the trial court from finding the
wife was equitably estopped from contesting the husband's paternity. 66
The wife next argued that, since the genetic testing excluded the hus-
band as the biological father of the child, section 160.631(d) of the Family
Code required the trial court to adjudicate the husband as not being the
father of the child.67 The court of appeals rejected the argument, noting
that the trial court had not adjudicated the husband as being the father of
the child.68 Rather, the trial court established the parent-child relation-
ship based on its equitable power to estop the wife from denying the hus-
band's paternity. 69
The court of appeals then considered the wife's argument that the evi-
dence was insufficient to support the equitable estoppel finding. The wife
contended the husband had to establish equitable estoppel by clear and
convincing evidence because section 160.608(d) establishes a clear and
convincing standard in order for the trial court to deny a motion for ge-
netic testing.70 The court of appeals concluded section 160.608(d) does
not apply when the trial court is exercising its equitable jurisdiction and,
although not clearly stated, apparently applied a preponderance of the
evidence standard to the sufficiency analysis. 71
In order for the wife to be equitably estopped, she must have
(1) made a false representation or concealment of material facts; (2)
with knowledge, actual or constructive, of those facts; (3) to a party
without knowledge, or the means of knowledge, of those facts; (4)
with the intention that it be acted upon; and (5) the party to whom it
was made must have relied on the misrepresentation to his
prejudice. 72
63. Hausman, 199 S.W.3d at 41-42.




67. Id. at 42-43; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.631(d) (Vernon 2002) ([u]nless re-
suits of genetic testing are admitted to rebut other results of genetic testing, a man ex-
cluded as the father of a child by genetic testing shall be adjudicated as not being the father
of the child.).
68. Hausman, 199 S.W.3d at 43.
69. Id.
70. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.608(d).




Here, there was evidence the wife engaged in unprotected sexual rela-
tions with another man and did not tell the husband about those rela-
tions. The wife represented to the husband that he was the child's father,
frequently commented on the similarity between the husband's and the
child's appearances, and referred to the husband as the child's "daddy.
73
By attending prenatal care, paying for medical care, and caring for the
child as his son, the husband relied on the wife's representations and con-
cealment of material facts.74 Accordingly, the evidence was legally and
factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding the wife was equita-
bly estopped from denying the husband was the child's father.
7 5
B. FROZEN EMBRYO AGREEMENTS
In a case of first impression in Texas, the Houston First Court of Ap-
peals considered the validity of agreements governing the disposition of
frozen embryos in Roman v. Roman.76 The husband and the wife mar-
ried in 1997 and, after a few years, began trying to have a child.7 7 Be-
cause they were unsuccessful in doing so, they decided to attempt in vitro
fertilization, which involves the fertilization of the wife's egg with the
husband's sperm in a laboratory procedure. During this process, the hus-
band and wife signed a number of documents including an Informed Con-
sent for Cryopreservation of Embryos authorizing the storage of embryos
created during the laboratory procedure in a frozen state until the medi-
cal facility determined that appropriate conditions existed for the transfer
of the embryos to the wife's uterus. The husband and the wife chose in
the agreement to discard the embryos in case of divorce. 78
Following the laboratory procedure, three embryos reached a stage of
development to warrant the cryopreservation process. The medical facil-
ity scheduled the implantation of these embryos into the wife's uterus.
However, the night before the scheduled implantation, the husband with-
drew his consent to the implantation. The husband subsequently filed for
divorce.79 The parties agreed to the division of the marital property other
than the embryos. The husband requested that the trial court uphold the
embryo agreement. The wife wanted to have the embryos implanted and
stated that if any children were born from the embryos, the husband
would not have parental rights or responsibilities. The trial court
awarded the embryos to the wife and made a finding that the embryos
were community property subject to a just and right division. 80 The hus-
band appealed, arguing the trial court erred in awarding the embryos to
73. Id.
74. See id. at 43-44.
75. Id. at 44.
76. 193 S.W.3d 40, 41-42 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. filed).
77. Id. at 42.
78. Id.




the wife in violation of the embryo agreement. 81
After an extensive analysis of cases from other states pertaining to fro-
zen embryo agreements, the court of appeals concluded that the emerg-
ing majority view is that "written embryo agreements between embryo
donors and fertility clinics to which all parties have consented are valid
and enforceable so long as the parties have the opportunity to withdraw
their consent to the terms of the agreements. '82 However, the court of
appeals still had to determine whether the agreements were against pub-
lic policy in Texas. 83
Turning to the Family Code, the court of appeals noted Texas has en-
acted laws regarding children of assisted reproduction as well as gesta-
tional agreements. 84 Although these statutes do not address how to
determine the disposition of the embryos in case of death or divorce, the
court of appeals concluded they demonstrate the public policy of Texas
that permits a husband and wife to voluntarily enter into agreement prior
to implantation providing for an embryo's disposition in the event of di-
vorce, death, or changed circumstances. 85 The agreements must be vol-
untary, be entered into prior to cryopreservation, and be subject to a
mutual change of mind.86 If the agreement meets all criteria, it should be
presumed valid and enforced between the parties. 87
The court of appeals then turned to contract law to determine whether
the agreement at issue was valid. 88 Both parties acknowledged they had
signed the agreement and initialed the section regarding disposition of
the embryos in case of divorce. The evidence showed the wife was aware
of and understood the significance of her decision. Further, the parties
chose to give the embryos to the surviving spouse in case of death, indi-
cating the parties were aware of other choices regarding the disposition of
the embryos. Finally, the agreement allowed the parties to withdraw
their consent to the procedure. Therefore, the court of appeals concluded
that the trial court erred by rewriting, rather than enforcing, the parties'
agreement. 89
C. BILL OF REVIEW
In Kiefer v. Touris,90 the Texas Supreme Court considered whether a
bill of review setting aside the parentage adjudication in a divorce decree
was a final judgment. The husband and the wife married in 1995. In
1996, the wife began an extra-marital affair and, in 1998, became preg-
81. Id.
82. Id. at 48.
83. Id. at 48-49.
84. Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.701-.707 (Vernon 2002), §§ 160.751-.763
(Vernon Supp. 2006)).
85. Id. at 49-50.
86. Id. at 49.
87. Id. at 50.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 54-55.
90. 197 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam).
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nant. When the husband and the wife divorced in 2000, the divorce de-
cree adjudicated them the parents of the child and named them joint
managing conservators. 91
The wife did not disclose to the biological father that she was divorced
or that the husband had been adjudicated a parent and ordered to pay
child support. She did, however, send him a proposed agreement that
acknowledged both their relationship and that the child was born of the
relationship. The agreement named the wife and the biological father as
joint managing conservators and required the biological father to pay
child support. Although the biological father did not sign the agreement,
he began paying child support to the wife. In 2002, the biological father
filed a petition for voluntary paternity in a different court than the one
that handled the wife's divorce. Paternity testing established to a 99.9%
certainty that he was the child's biological father.92
After learning about the divorce decree, the biological father filed a
bill of review in the divorce court, seeking to set aside the decree's par-
entage determination. 93 The trial court granted -the bill of review by sum-
mary judgment and set aside the parentage determination in the divorce
decree but did not enter a new adjudication of parentage. 94 The husband
and the wife appealed.95
The supreme court noted a bill of review setting aside a prior judgment
but not disposing of all issues in the case on the merits is not a final judg-
ment.96 Because the trial court had not entered a new adjudication of
parentage with its attendant custody and support orders, the summary
judgment was not final. 97 Even though the biological father's voluntary
paternity petition was pending in another court, the divorce court had
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over any suit affecting the parent-child
relationship ("SAPCR"). 98 Accordingly, the divorce court had jurisdic-
tion over the parentage issue. 99
IV. SUIT AFFECTING THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP
A. VENUE
Generally, venue for a SAPCR is the county where the child resides.100
With some statutory exceptions, once the trial court issues a final order in
a SAPCR, it acquires continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over matters af-
91. Id. at 301.






98. Id. at 302 n.3.
99. Id.
100. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 103.001(a) (Vernon 2002).
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fecting the parent-child relationship.10 1 However, if a motion to modify
or enforce an existing order is filed, that motion is subject to mandatory
transfer to another county if the child has resided in the second county
for six months or longer. l0
2
1. Forfeiture of Right to Transfer
In Huey v. Huey,1° 3 the divorce decree restricted the geographical resi-
dence of the children to Collin County and any contiguous county. The
father filed a motion to modify, alleging, among other things, that the
mother violated the divorce decree by moving the children to Howard
County, a county not contiguous to Collin County, and by residing with a
person to whom she was neither married nor related. At the hearing on
the father's motion, both parties announced they were ready to proceed.
However, after the father called his first witness, the mother informed the
trial court she had filed a motion to transfer the matter to Howard
County based on the children's residence in that county. The trial court
denied the motion to transfer and granted the father's motion to
modify. 10 4
On appeal, the mother argued section 155.201(b) of the Family Code
required the trial court to transfer the case because the children had re-
sided in Howard County for over six months.10 5 The court of appeals
disagreed, concluding that the mother's conduct in moving the children to
Howard County directly contravened the existing divorce decree and
was, in effect, an attempt to establish the children's residence in a county
proscribed by the decree. 10 6 The mother forfeited her right to have the
case transferred under section 155.021 by moving the children in violation
of the decree.10 7
2. Timeliness of Motion to Transfer
The Houston Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District addressed
when the motion to transfer is required to be filed in In re Compton.108
In Compton, the 306th District Court of Galveston County entered a final
order affecting the parent-child relationship in May 2004.109 The child
and the mother then moved to Harris County. On February 4, 2005, the
father filed a motion in the Galveston court, seeking to modify custody
and requesting a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and a temporary
injunction. The Galveston court granted the TRO on February 5, 2005,
101. § 155.001(a). The exceptions are final orders that (1) are a voluntary or involun-
tary dismissal of a SAPCR; (2) find an alleged or presumed father is not the father of the
child; and (3) are a final order of adoption. Id. § 155.002(b).
102. § 155.201(b) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
103. 200 S.W.3d 851 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
104. Id. at 852.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 853.
107. Id.
108. 185 S.W.3d 526 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
109. Id. at 527.
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and set a show cause hearing for February 10, 2005. The hearing was
concluded on February 15, 2005, and the next day the associate judge
awarded temporary custody of the child to the father.110
In the interim, on February 11, 2005, the mother filed a motion to
transfer the suit to Harris County because the child had resided there for
the preceding six months. The trial court denied the transfer and the
mother sought mandamus relief.1 1 1
The transfer was mandatory under section 155.201 if the mother timely
filed the motion.112 The motion was timely if it was "made on or before
the first Monday after the 20th day after the date of service of citation or
notice of the suit or before the commencement of the hearing, whichever
is sooner." 1 3 It was undisputed the mother filed the motion prior to her
answer date. The issue was whether "the hearing" referenced in section
155.204(b) was any hearing in the case, as alleged by the father, or the
final hearing on the merits, as claimed by the mother.
1 14
The court of appeals agreed with the mother, noting that the legisla-
ture's use of "the hearing," rather than "a hearing" or "any hearing" sug-
gested a "single, particular hearing" was intended. 1 5 The court of
appeals also rejected the father's argument that, because Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 245 requires forty-five days notice of a trial setting, the
answer date could never occur prior to the final hearing date, making that
portion of section 155.204(b) meaningless. 116 In the court's opinion, a
small, simple, or uncontested case could have a final hearing prior to the
party's answer date."17 Accordingly, "the hearing" in section 155.204 re-
fers to "whatever final hearing is conducted to ultimately dispose" of the
pending matter. 1 8 Therefore, a hearing on a motion for temporary relief
or another matter, such as a request for temporary orders, conducted
before the party's answer date is not a deadline for filing a motion to
transfer venue.1 9 Because the mother's motion was timely, she was enti-
tled to mandamus relief.120
3. Possession of Child
During the Survey period, the Beaumont Court of Appeals had occa-
sion to address the proper venue for filing an original SAPCR. In In re
Narvaiz,12 1 the mother and the father had a child out of wedlock in 1999.




113. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 155.204(b) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
114. In re Compton, 185 S.W.3d at 527-28.
115. Id. at 528.
116. Id. at 529.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 531.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 193 S.W.3d 695 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2006, orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
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mother moved out of the county. In February 2003, the mother and the
child moved to San Antonio.
Between February 2003 and mid-July 2005, the parents exchanged pos-
session of the child every one or two weeks. In June 2005, the mother
enrolled the child in school for August 2005 in Bexar County, the
mother's county of residence.1 2 2 The next month, the father told the
mother he was not returning the child and would enroll her in school in
Montgomery County, the father's county of residence. The mother told
the father that if he would return the child to her, he could have the child
before school started. The father returned the child to the mother, who
did not return the child as promised. The father filed suit in Montgomery
County, seeking to be named a joint managing conservator of the child
with the exclusive right to designate the child's primary residence and
requesting the mother be required to pay child support.' 23
The mother filed a motion to transfer venue to Bexar County. After an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court found the parents were sharing the
actual care, control, and possession of the child and, thus, suit could be
brought in either county of residence. 124 The trial court denied the mo-
tion to transfer and the mother filed a petition for writ of mandamus. 25
The court of appeals noted venue in a SAPCR is based on the resi-
dence of the child. 126 However, if the child's parents do not reside in the
same county, then the residence of the child is determined by the county
in which the parent having actual care, control, and possession of the
child resides. 127 It was undisputed the only reason the father did not have
possession of the child when he filed the SAPCR was because the mother
failed to return the child as promised. However, the court of appeals
determined the statute does not base venue on constructive possession.' 28
Because the father did not have actual care, control, and possession of
the child at the time he filed the SAPCR, venue was not proper in Mont-
gomery County. 12 9
B. ARBITRATION
Section 153.0071 of the Family Code allows the parties to a SAPCR to
agree to arbitration. 130 In In re TB.H.-H.,13 1 the parties reached an
agreement to arbitrate, and the trial court subsequently entered an order
in accordance with the arbitrator's award. The mother filed a motion for
122. Id. at 697.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 697-98.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 698 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 103.001(a) (Vernon 2002)).
127. Id. (citing §103.001(c)( 2)).
128. Id. at 700.
129. Id.
130. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.0071(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006) (stating that parties can
agree in writing for the trial court to refer SAPCR to binding or non-binding arbitration).
131. 188 S.W.3d 312 (Tex. App.-Waco 2006, no pet.).
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new trial, contending the order was not in the best interest of the child. 132
The Waco Court of Appeals noted section 153.0071(b) allows the trial
court to substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator when the trial
court determines at a non-jury hearing that the award is not in the best
interest of the child.133 However, the mother was required to request the
best interest hearing to invoke the right to the hearing and preserve the
complaint for appeal.' 34 The best interest hearing must be held before
the trial court enters an order on the arbitrator's award.135 By failing to
timely file a motion to vacate the arbitrator's award, the mother waived
her right to a best-interest hearing. 13
6
C. GRANDPARENT ACCESS
In In re Mays-Hooper,137 the Texas Supreme Court reviewed a trial
court's order granting a grandmother access to her grandchild over the
mother's objections. The supreme court noted the facts were almost
identical to those in Troxel v. Granville138 in that a child was born during
the marriage, the parties divorced, the father subsequently died, and then
conflicts arose between the mother and her ex-mother-in-law about the
grandmother's visitation with the child. Without "sorting out" the vari-
ous opinions in Troxel, the supreme court noted a plurality of four justices
found the visitation statute in Troxel unconstitutional as applied because
the child's mother was not unfit, her decisions about grandparent access
were given no deference, and the mother was willing to allow some visita-
tion. 139 Due to the factual similarities between the two cases, if the trial
court's order in Troxel was unconstitutional, the order in Mays-Hooper
must also be unconstitutional. 140 The court declined to analyze the stat-
ute further because it had been amended during the 2005 legislative
session.14 1
D. SECURING TESTIMONY OF CHILDREN
In In re Z.A. T.,142 the Waco Court of Appeals considered whether the
trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant an incarcerated fa-
ther's motion requesting the mother be required to produce the children
132. ld. at 314.




137. 189 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
138. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
139. In re Mays-Hooper, 189 S.W.3d at 777-78 (citing Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-71).
140. Id. at 778.
141. Id. The amendment requires a grandparent seeking access to or possession of a
grandchild to overcome a presumption that a parent acts in the best interest of the child by
proving the denial of access to or possession of the grandchild will significantly impair the
child's physical health or emotional well-being. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.433 (Vernon
Supp. 2006).
142. 193 S.W.3d 197 (Tex. App.-Waco 2006, pet. denied) (plurality opinion).
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to testify at the hearing on the father's motion to modify. The court ini-
tially reversed and remanded for a new trial. 143 However, the trial court
filed a "Request for Reconsideration of Memorandum Opinion," assert-
ing the court of appeals was incorrect in finding the trial court had re-
fused to permit the children to testify, and setting out the procedure used
by the trial court for having a child witness subpoenaed through their
parent or guardian. The court of appeals essentially granted the trial
court's motion to reconsider, withdrew its opinion, and affirmed the trial
court's order. 144
The parties divorced in December 2002, and the mother was named
sole managing conservator of the children. The father, who was incarcer-
ated at the time of the divorce under a forty-year sentence, proceeded to
file numerous proceedings with respect to his parental and custodial
rights. 145 This appeal involved the father's latest motion to modify the
conservatorship provisions of the decree and the mother's competing pe-
tition to limit the father's repeated filings and to prevent him from com-
municating with her or the children other than through her attorney or
some other designated person. The father filed a motion seeking to re-
quire the mother to bring the children to the hearing. 1 46 The trial court
denied the motion. 147
Along with numerous other issues, the father contended the trial court
abused its discretion by denying the motion and violated his right to due
process by excluding the children from testifying at the hearing. In the
lead opinion, Justice Reyna concluded the father's failure to request sub-
poenas for the children was "fatal to his contention.' 48 Justice Reyna
recognized there was no statute or rule providing for the issuance of a
subpoena to a child witness in a civil trial. 149 However, a child who "pos-
sess[es] sufficient intellect to relate transactions with respect to which
they are interrogated" is a "person" who may testify in a civil proceed-
ing. 1 50 Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 176.2(a) "authorizes a civil litigant
to obtain a subpoena commanding a 'person' to 'attend and give testi-
mony' at a hearing or trial.' 15'
Although there are potential drawbacks to issuing a subpoena for a
child witness, such as straining the relationship between the parents or
between one of the parents and the child, "the law does not provide an-
other means by which a parent may compel his or her child's testi-
mony."' 152 Further, there are means available, such as a motion to quash,
143. See generally In re Z.A.T., No. 10-04-00347-CV, 2005 WL 3072854 (Tex. App.-
Waco Nov. 16, 2005, no pet.) (op. withdrawn).
144. In re Z.A.T., 193 S.W.3d at 211.
145. Id. at 202.
146. Id. at 206.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 207.
150. Id. (citing TEx. R. EvID. 601(a)).




a protective order, or sanctions, to address an inappropriate subpoena.' 53
Chief Justice Gray concurred in the judgment only, first stating the
court of appeals was setting a dangerous precedent by responding to a
trial court's motion for reconsideration. 154 Chief Justice Gray noted the
trial court's procedure was to have a subpoena for a child witness served
on their parent or guardian.1 55 Although Chief Justice Gray did not fault
this alternative procedure used by the trial court, he noted a careful prac-
titioner needs to strictly comply with the rules regarding subpoenaing a
witness in order to preserve the issue for appeal.1 56
In Chief Justice Gray's view, the father's issues on appeal did not com-
port with the issues decided by the trial court and should not be re-
viewed. 157 Further, the father waived any error by not making a bill of
exception as to what the children's testimony would have been and by not
requesting a continuance due to the absence of a witness. 158 However, if
the merits of the issue are reached, the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in denying the motion because there were procedures to compel the
attendance of witnesses that the father did not use.159
Justice Vance dissented, concluding there was no specific, applicable
statutory authority that allowed the father to personally serve the chil-
dren with subpoenas or to have the children served through the
mother.1 60 Therefore, the father's motion was a reasonable attempt to
compel the children's attendance.' 6 ' The trial court abused its discretion
by denying the motion without informing the father of the available alter-
native procedure to subpoena the children through the mother.' 62
V. TERMINATION
A. GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION
A trial court can terminate a party's parental rights only if there is clear
and convincing evidence (1) of a statutory ground for termination, and
(2) that termination is in the best interest of the child. 163 During the Sur-
vey period, the two Houston Courts of Appeals considered the necessary
grounds for termination from two different aspects, with the First district
changing course on what grounds can be considered on appeal and the
Fourteenth District addressing the issue of whether spanking, by itself, is
sufficient to support the termination of parental rights.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 212.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 214.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 215.
160. Id. at 218-19.
161. Id. at 219.
162. Id.
163. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
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1. Grounds in Termination Order
In Thompson v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services,164
the trial court's order terminating the father's parental rights recited only
one statutory ground for the termination. 165 The Houston Court of Ap-
peals for the First District rejected the father's argument that the listed
ground was the only basis for the trial court's judgment that could be
considered by the court of appeals. 166 Rather, because the trial court
made no findings of fact, the judgment would be affirmed if any legal
theory supported the termination. 167 The court then concluded the evi-
dence was sufficient to support the termination on a statutory ground
different than the one recited in the termination order. 168
The Houston Court of Appeals for the First District sitting en banc
revisited and overruled Thompson in Cervantes-Peterson v. Texas Depart-
ment of Family & Protective Services.169 In Cervantes-Peterson, the Texas
Department of Family and Protective Services (the "Department")
pleaded two statutory grounds for termination, but the trial court recited
only one ground in its termination order.170 On appeal, the Department
relied on Thompson and argued that the trial court could have made im-
plied findings on the other statutory ground, and by failing to challenge
the implied findings on appeal, the mother had essentially waived any
error.
171
The court of appeals interpreted the Department's argument as requir-
ing the court of appeals to affirm a termination order "if the parent fails
to challenge on appeal grounds not found in the termination order but
supported by the evidence.' 72 The court of appeals rejected this argu-
ment, noting section 161.206 of the Family Code requires the trial court to
find grounds for the termination and then render an order of termina-
tion.173 The court of appeals then overruled Thompson and concluded
that the ground, or grounds, for the termination in the trial court's judg-
ment can form the basis for an appeal, and that the court of appeals re-
views the sufficiency of the evidence to support the specific statutory
grounds found by the trial court in the termination order. 174
164. 176 S.W.3d 121 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied), overruled by
Cervantes-Peterson v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., No. 01-05-00307-CV, 2006
WL 2195241, at *6 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 3, 2006, no pet.) (en banc).
165. See § 161.001 (listing statutory grounds for termination of parent-child
relationship).
166. Thompson, 176 S.W.3d at 125.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 125-28.
169. Cervantes-Peterson, 2006 WL 2195241, at *6.
170. Id. at *4.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at *5; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.206 (Vernon Supp. 2006) (if the trial
court finds by clear and convincing evidence grounds for termination, it shall render an
order terminating parent-child relationship).




In In re J.A.J.,175 the Department removed an eight-year-old child after
his stepfather choked the child with shoestrings, leaving visible marks on
the child's neck. Immediately after the removal, the Department
caseworker discovered a six-inch wide bruise on the back of the child's
leg. The mother admitted she had spanked the child with a belt the previ-
ous day after he attempted to "burn down the house."1 76 The mother
also admitted the spanking left marks and bruises on the child. Approxi-
mately ten months later, the trial court terminated the mother's parental
rights to the child.177
The mother argued on appeal that the evidence was legally and factu-
ally insufficient to support. the termination. After concluding the evi-
dence was insufficient to support termination on any other ground found
by the trial court, the court of appeals turned to the mother's admitted
spanking of the child. 178 Based on the evidence at trial, the court of ap-
peals framed the issue as "whether infrequent spankings of a child that
leave 'marks' or visible bruises 24 hours after the spanking constitute suf-
ficient evidence" to support a finding the mother endangered the child's
physical or emotional well-being to a degree that warranted termination
of her parental rights. 179
The court of appeals noted the "propriety of corporal punishment" is a
controversial subject.180 Although spanking as a form of discipline has
fallen under attack, "at least ninety percent of American parents have
used corporal punishment at some time" in disciplining their children. 18'
Further, there is evidence that "authoritative" styles of discipline, "char-
acterized by strict discipline, high demands for obedience, and high levels
of warmth, tend to produce better-adjusted children than non-authorita-
tive styles.' 82 At least one sociologist has suggested there may be a "di-
rect correlation between the declining use of corporal punishment and
rising juvenile violence. ' 183 Nevertheless, courts have increasingly con-
cluded that "spanking with a belt constitutes child abuse and may be con-
sidered as a fact in terminating a person's parental rights." 184
175. No. 14-04-01031-CV, 2006 WL 2291175 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 10,
2006, no pet.) (op. on reh'g). The court issued a previous opinion on December 13, 2005
that was withdrawn and replaced with the August 10, 2006 opinion. A second motion for
rehearing was overruled by the court of appeals on February 1, 2007.
176. Id. at *1.
177. Id. at *1-2.
178. Id. at *2-5.
179. Id. at *5.
180. Id. at *6.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. (citing Steven L. Nock, Violence in the Family: Is Spanking Universal?, 8 VA. J.
Soc. POL'Y & L. 61, 67 (2000)).
184. Id. (citing In re Adrian H., No. A102631, 2003 WL 23100264, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App.
Dec. 31, 2003); In re T.M.K., No. COA04-1019, 2005 WL 1804792, at *1 (N.C. Ct. App.




The court's role was not to impose a legal standard consistent with its
personal ideas on how best to discipline a child. 185 Rather, it was re-
quired to determine if the child's welfare had been compromised. 186
While there was some evidence the mother may have used excessive
force on the child, the record did not support a finding the mother had
regularly and excessively hit the child.187 Accordingly, the evidence was
insufficient to support the termination order. 188
B. FAILURE TO DISMISS
The Texas Legislature has determined that children removed from their
homes by the Department should not remain in the Department's care
indefinitely.189 To further this. goal, the legislature enacted section
263.401(a) of the Family Code requiring a trial court to dismiss a SAPCR
filed by the Department if a final order has not been entered by the first
Monday after the one-year anniversary of the date when the trial court
appointed the Department temporary managing conservator of the
child.' 90 The statute allows for a maximum extension of 180 days.191 If
the trial court has not rendered a final order at the expiration of the addi-
tional 180 days, then the court must dismiss the SAPCR.192
In In re Texas Department of Family & Protective Services,193 the dis-
missal date after the 180-day extension was July 24, 2004. The termina-
tion trial began on July 19, 2004.194 On Thursday, July 22, 2004, the
mother and the great-grandmother, who had intervened in the proceed-
ings, filed motions to dismiss for failure to render a final order before the
statutory deadline. The Department rested its case on Friday, July 23,
2004, and the trial recommenced on Tuesday, July 27, 2004. The next day,
the jury returned a unanimous verdict terminating the mother's parental
rights and appointing the Department, rather than the great-grand-
mother, as sole managing conservator of the children. 195
The great-grandmother and the mother filed petitions for writ of man-
damus with the Austin Court of Appeals, "seeking to compel the trial
court to dismiss the case for failure to render a final order before the




189. See SENATE COMM. ON JURISPRUDENCE, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 34, 75th Leg.,
R.S. (1997).
190. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
191. Id. § 263.401(b)-( c).
192. Id. § 263.401(c). Section 263.403 provides an exception to the dismissal rule if the
trial court orders the monitored return of the child to the parent. Id. § 263.403(a).
193. 210 S.W.3d 609 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding). Although the date of this opinion
is after the Survey period, on September 22, 2006, the supreme court issued a per curiam
opinion substantially the same as the new majority opinion. See generally In re Tex. Dep't
of Family & Protective Servs., No. 04-1043, 2006 WL 2708467 (Tex. Sept. 22, 2006) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam) (op. withdrawn).




dismissal date. ' 196 The court of appeals granted the requested relief, and
the Department sought mandamus relief from the Texas Supreme
Court. 1
97
The supreme court first considered whether the mother and the great-
grandmother waived their complaint that the trial court failed to render a
timely final order. Section 263.402 of the Family Code allows a party to
obtain a dismissal by filing a motion to dismiss before the Department
introduces all its evidence, other than rebuttal evidence, or by filing a
motion for final order before the dismissal deadline passes.198 The
mother and the great-grandmother preserved their complaint by filing
motions to dismiss before the Department rested its case. 199 Accord-
ingly, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to dismiss the case.200
The supreme court then considered whether the mother and the great-
grandmother were entitled to mandamus relief. The supreme court ac-
knowledged that child custody cases need to be resolved expeditiously
and that an appeal is often "inadequate to protect the rights of parents
and children." 20 1 However, section 263.405 of the Family Code addresses
this concern by providing for an accelerated appeal with shortened dead-
lines, an expedited filing of the record, and the requirement that the ap-
pellate court "render its final order or judgment with the least possible
delay. '20 2 Because the trial was in process when the dismissal deadline
passed and because the Department already had physical possession of
the children when the petitions for writ of mandamus were filed, an accel-
erated appeal was an adequate remedy at law. 20 3 Accordingly, neither
the mother nor the great-grandmother was entitled to relief by manda-
mus. 20 4 However, mandamus relief could be available in situations in-
volving the "impending transfer of physical possession of the children or
a trial court's unreasonable delay in entering a final decree. '20 5
C. APPEAL
Section 263.405 of the Family Code provides for an accelerated appeal
of a final order in cases where the Department has assumed the care of
the child. 206 An order is final if it
(1) requires that a child be returned to the child's parent; (2) names a
relative of the child or another person as the child's managing con-
196. Id. There is no record on the Austin Court of Appeals' website of either the great-
grandmother or the mother appealing the termination order.
197. Id.




202. Id. (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.405 (Vernon Supp. 2006)).
203. Id. at 614.
204. Id. Justice O'Neill filed a dissenting opinion concluding the court of appeals prop-
erly granted mandamus relief to the mother and the great-grandmother. Id. at 614-16.
205. Id. at 614.
206. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.405 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
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servator; (3) without terminating the parent-child relationship, ap-
points the Department as the managing conservator of the child; or
(4) terminates the parent-child relationship and appoints a relative of
the child, another suitable person, or the Department as managing
conservator of the child. 20 7
Under section 263.405, within fifteen days of the trial court signing the
final order, the party must file with the trial court either a statement of
the points the party intends to appeal or a statement of points combined
with a motion for new trial.20 8 The notice of appeal must be filed within
twenty days of the trial court entering the final order.20 9 Within thirty
days of signing the final order, the trial court must hold a hearing to de-
termine whether a new trial should be granted, whether any claim of indi-
gency should be sustained, and whether the appeal is frivolous as
provided by section 13.003(b) of the Civil Practice and Remedies
Code. 210 The appellate record must be filed within sixty days after the
final order is entered and the appellate court is required to "render its
final order or judgment with the least possible delay."'21 1
1. Statement of Points
After the Texas Legislature enacted section 263.405 in 2001, the courts
of appeals addressed the impact of the statement of points required to be
filed in the trial court and almost uniformly held the statement of points
was not jurisdictional and did not affect the party's right to raise an issue
on appeal.2 12 During the 2005 legislative session, the legislature reacted
to these opinions by enacting section 263.405(i) of the Family Code man-
dating that, for any appeal filed after September 1, 2005, the appellate
court could not "consider any issue that was not specifically presented to
the trial court in a timely filed statement of points on which the party
intends to appeal or in a statement combined with a motion for new
trial. '2 13 Further, a claim in the statement of points that the evidence is
207. Id. § 263.401(d).
208. Id. § 263.405(b).
209. Id. § 263.405(c); TEX. R. App. P. 26.1(b).
210. Id. § 263.405(d).
211. Id. § 263.405(a), (f).
212. In re S.P., 168 S.W.3d 197, 201 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.) (determining a
statement of points is not jurisdictional and is not an additional requirement for preserving
error); In re T.A.C.W., 143 S.W.3d 249, 250 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.) (main-
taining a failure to timely file statement of points did not deprive the appellate court of
jurisdiction); In re S.J.G., 124 S.W.3d 237, 243 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied)
(concluding the failure to file statement of points is not a jurisdictional defect that prevents
an appellate court from addressing issues on appeal); In re W.J.H., 111 S.W.3d 707, 712
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (concluding a failure to include issue in state-
ment of points does not preclude a party from raising an issue on appeal unless the oppo-
nent shows prejudice). But see In re T.C., No. 07-03-0077-CV, 2003 WL 21658314, at *2
(Tex. App.-Amarillo July 15, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (determining an issue not in-
cluded in the statement of points is not preserved for review on appeal).
213. Id. § 263.405(i); see HOUSE COMM. ON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND FAMILY ISSUES,
BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B. 409, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005) (stating recent appellate decisions
have effectively repealed the legislature's attempt to address the post-judgment delay issue
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legally or factually insufficient is not specific enough to preserve the issue
for appeal.214 Appellate decisions issued during the Survey period com-
ply with the legislature's directive by concluding if an issue is not
presented to the trial court in a statement of points or in a statement of
points combined with a motion for new trial, that issue is not preserved
and may not be considered on appeal.215
In his concurrence in In re E.A.R.,2 16 Justice Vance questioned the pro-
cedural due-process aspects of subsection 263.405(i). In Justice Vance's
view, the strict deadlines in section 263.405, coupled with time delays an
indigent parent may experience in obtaining appointed appellate counsel,
could deprive appellate review of any issues.21 7 However, because the
constitutional issues were not before the court, Justice Vance concurred
in the affirmance of the trial court's termination order.218 The Fort
Worth Court of Appeals has joined Justice Vance "in questioning the
practical applications and constitutional validity of this statute. '219
2. Constitutionality of Appeal Process
In In re K.D.220and In re T.C.,2 2 1 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals
considered whether section 263.405 was unconstitutional "because it
treats an indigent party's appeal differently than a non-indigent party's
appeal and because it makes a distinction between parents in a private
termination case and parents in a termination case brought by the De-
partment. ' 222 In both cases, appellants argued the statute allows a trial
court to deny an indigent appellant a record of the trial, while a non-
indigent appellant could purchase the record. 223 Further, section 263.405
"subjects a parent whose parental rights have been terminated in a suit
brought by the government to a hearing held by the trial court to deter-
mine whether [the] appeal is frivolous, while a parent whose parental
rights have been terminated in a suit brought by an individual is able to
and that House Bill 409 conclusively establishes the legislature expects litigants to comply
with subsection 263.405(b)).
214. Id. § 263.405(i).
215. In re D.A.R., 201 S.W.3d 229, 230 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet) (cannot
consider issue on appeal not raised in statement of points); In re E.A.R. 201 S.W.3d 813,
813-14 (Tex. App.-Waco 2006, no pet.) (failure to file statement of points precluded ap-
pellate court from considering issues on appeal); In re S.E., 203 S.W.3d 14, 15 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 2006, no pet.) Although slightly outside the Survey period, the Houston
Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District and the El Paso Court of Appeals have also
concluded they cannot consider any issue on appeal not raised in a timely filed statement
of points. In re A.H.L.,III., 214 S.W.3d 45, 53 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2006, pet. denied); In re
C.M., 208 S.W.3d 89, 91-92 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
216. 201 S.W.3d at 814.
217. Id. at 816-17.
218. Id. at 818.
219. In re D.A.R., 201 S.W.3d at 231.
220. 202 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (op. on reh'g).
221. 200 S.W.3d 788 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.).
222. In re K.D., 202 S.W.3d at 863.
223. Id.; In re T.C., 200 S.W.3d at 790.
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freely appeal the termination order. '22 4
Turning to the first argument, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals con-
cluded section 263.405 requires the trial court to hold a hearing within
thirty days of the final order at which the trial court determines whether a
new trial should be granted, whethe? any claim of indigency should be
sustained, and whether any appeal would be frivolous. 22 5 Section
263.405(d) does not set out the test for determining whether a party is
indigent and, therefore, entitled to a free record. 226 Rather, that test is
found in section 13.003 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which
requires (1) an affidavit of inability to pay the cost of the appeal, and (2)
a finding by the trial court that the appeal is not frivolous and that the
reporter's and clerk's record are needed to decide the issue presented by
the appeal.227
Reading section 263.405 and section 13.003 together, the court of ap-
peals determined that there are two statutory consequences of a trial
court finding an appeal would be frivolous.22 8 First, under section
263.405(g), the scope of appellate review is limited to the trial court's
determination that the appeal is frivolous.229 This limitation on the scope
of appellate review following a frivolousness determination is applicable
to both indigent and non-indigent appellants. 230
The second statutory consequence of a frivolousness determination is
the denial of a free appellate record to an indigent appellant. 231 The
court of appeals concluded the disparate impact of the second conse-
quence of a frivolousness determination is immaterial because of the first
consequence. 232 Once the trial court determines any appeal would be
frivolous, "the scope of appellate review is statutorily limited to a review
of the trial court's frivolousness finding. ' 233 Nothing in the statute sug-
gests a non-indigent appellant has a right to file any record on appeal
other than the record of the frivolousness hearing.2 34 Further, the record
of the frivolousness hearing is required to be provided without the ad-
vance payment of costs. 235 Accordingly, any appellant, regardless of
whether they are indigent, is statutorily guaranteed the same limited ap-
224. In re TC., 200 S.W.3d at 790.
225. Id. at 791 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.405(d) (Vernon Supp. 2006)); In re
K.D., 202 S.W.3d at 564.
226. In re K.D., 202 S.W.3d at 864; In re T.C., 200 S.W.3d at 791.
227. In re K.D., 202 S.W.3d at 864, In re T.C., 200 S.W.3d at 791. An appeal is frivolous
under section 13.003 if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. In re K.D., 202 S.W.3d at
866.
228. In re K.D., 202 S.W.3d at 865; In re T.C., 200 S.W.3d at 791.
229. In re K.D., 202 S.W.3d at 865; In re T.C., 200 S.W.3d at 791.
230. In re K.D., 202 S.W.3d at 865; In re T.C., 200 S.W.3d at 791-92.
231. In re K.D., 202 S.W.3d at 865; In re T.C., 200 S.W.3d at 792.
232. In re K.D., 202 S.W.3d at 865; In re T.C., 200 S.W.3d at 792.
233. In re K.D. 202 S.W.3d at 865; In re T.C., 200 S.W.3d at 792 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 263.405(g) (Vernon Supp. 2006)).
234. In re K.D., 202 S.W.3d at 865; In re T.C., 200 S.W.3d at 792.
235. In re K.D., 202 S.W.3d at 865; In re T.C., 200 S.W.3d at 792.
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pellate review of the trial court's frivolousness finding.236
The court of appeals then turned to the contention that the statute un-
constitutionally limited an appeal to the trial court's frivolousness deter-
mination in a state-initiated termination, while a parent facing
termination initiated by a private party has the right to a full appeal
under section 109.002 of the Family Code. 237 The court of appeals con-
cluded an indigent parent in a termination initiated by a private party
who requested a free record would be subject to a determination of
whether any appeal would be frivolous under section 13.003 of the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code. 238 If the trial court determined the appeal
would be frivolous, the indigent parent in a termination initiated by a
private party would be limited to appellate review of the trial court's friv-
olousness determination. 239 Therefore, indigent parents in a private ter-
mination proceeding are in the same position as indigent parents in a
state-initiated proceeding. 240 Accordingly, section 263.405 does not vio-
late an indigent appellant's equal protection or due process rights. 241
The court of appeals finally considered the contention that section
263.405 was unconstitutional because it denies an appellant the right to
appeal with a full record. The court of appeals noted an appellate court
has the authority to order the preparation of a full record when necessary
to review a trial court's determination that an appeal raising a factual
sufficiency complaint is frivolous. 242 Because the court of appeals had
ordered, and reviewed, the full record in both cases, neither appellant
was denied a meaningful appeal. 243
D. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
In Texas, there is a statutory right to counsel for indigent persons in
cases brought by the State to terminate parental rights. 244 This right em-
bodies the right to effective counsel.245 To establish ineffective assistance
of counsel, the appellant must establish that counsel's assistance fell be-
low an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient assis-
tance prejudiced the appellant.246 The record must affirmatively
236. In re K.D., 202 S.W.3d at 865; In re T.C., 200 S.W.3d at 792.
237. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002 (Vernon 2002) (allowing appeal from final termi-
nation order "as in civil cases generally").
238. In re K.D., 202 S.W.3d at 865; In re T.C., 200 S.W.3d at 792.
239. In re K.D., 202 S.W.3d at 865-66; In re T.C., 200 S.W.3d at 792.
240. In re K.D., 202 S.W.3d at 865-66; In re T.C., 200 S.W.3d at 792.
241. In re K.D., 202 S.W.3d at 866; In re T.C., 200 S.W.3d at 792.
242. In re K.D., 202 S.W.3d at 866; In re T.C., 200 S.W.3d at 793 (citing In re M.R.J.M.,
193 S.W.3d 670, 676 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (en banc)). The San Antonio
Court of Appeals used the same procedure in ordering the full reporter's record to deter-
mine whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding the mother's complaint that
the trial denied her a jury trial was frivolous. In re M.N.V., 216 S.W.3d 833, 835 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.).
243. In re K.D., 202 S.W.3d at 866; In re T.C., 200 S.W.3d at 793.
244. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
245. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544 (Tex. 2003).
246. Id. at 545 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).
1078 [Vol. 60
Parent and Child
demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness.2 47
In In re K.K.,2 48 the Waco Court of Appeals considered the impact of
an accelerated appeal in termination cases on an indigent parent's right to
raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on appeal. The court of
appeals was confronted with the mother's and one of the father's conten-
tion they received ineffective assistance of counsel because neither of
their attorneys moved to dismiss the termination case based on the statu-
tory deadline in section 263.401 of the Family Code. 249 The court of ap-
peals acknowledged the absence of a record on the ineffective assistance
claim almost certainly precluded the parents from prevailing on that issue
on appeal. 250 The court of appeals struggled with the equities, noting the
applicable post-trial deadlines not only deprive an indigent parent in a
termination proceeding of a meaningful appeal, but make it a:
practical impossibility for an indigent parent to obtain appointed ap-
pellate counsel, file a motion for new trial alleging ineffective assis-
tance, and submit evidence (either by testimony or affidavit from
appointed trial counsel) to develop a record that shows trial coun-
sel's reasons or strategies for the conduct that is the basis for the
ineffective-assistance claim. 2 51
The court of appeals concluded it was a "useless gesture" to provide indi-
gent parents with the right to effective assistance of counsel, "but not to
provide them with the procedural ability to prevail on a meritorious inef-
fective-assistance claim. '252
Due to this concern, the court of appeals abated the case and re-
manded it to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing at which the
mother and the father could develop their ineffective assistance claims.253
Chief Justice Gray dissented to the "new procedure created out of whole
cloth by the majority. ' 254 In Chief Justice Gray's view, section 161.211 of
the Family Code allows appellate counsel the option of simultaneously
filing a writ of habeas corpus to develop the record on the ineffective
assistance claim.255
VI. CONCLUSION
Painting with a broad brush, the cases during the Survey period pro-
vide guidance to litigants and trial courts about the substantive and pro-
cedural rules being applied to a number of issues affecting the parent-
child relationship, hopefully leading to more consistent results in this
247. In re J.W., 113 S.W.3d 605, 616 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied).
248. 180 S.W.3d 681 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005, no pet.) (per curiam).
249. Id. at 683.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 686.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 688.
254. Id. at 689.
255. Id.; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.211 (Vernon 2002) (stating termination judg-
ment is not subject to collateral attack after six months from date of signing).
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practice area. Although the courts applied the Family Code to issues af-
fecting the parent-child relationship, the cases demonstrate there are
many issues not addressed by the Family Code that must be analyzed
under common law and contract principles. It also appears the courts are
increasingly relying on equitable theories in attempting to address many
difficult, but not unusual, fact patterns. This requires the litigant to care-
fully look at his case from many different aspects prior to framing the
issues for either the trial court or the appellate court.
